Chancellorsville, Part One: Once Again, across the Rappahannock

Robert E. Lee’s victory at Fredericksburg in December 1862 was a thorough one, and enough to put the Union army to bed for a few months. By late April 1863, however, it was time for a fresh campaign. The previous January, General Joseph Hooker (above) had replaced the defeated Ambrose Burnside at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker remained encamped at Falmouth, Virginia, until spring broke, which gave him time to organize his command and to prepare to take his own offensive against Lee’s Army of Virginia.

Possibly more critical than the Battle of Fredericksburg, the battle at Chancellorsville would secure Lee’s legacy as a strategist; the victory in this small Virginia community would propel him toward Gettysburg and rush the Confederacy into the war’s most pivotal moment.

Chancellorsville would also serve as the first and only installment in the command of Joseph Hooker. Hooker was a soldier’s soldier, and he took care of his men. He was not as kind to his superiors, however, and he had a reputation for being cantankerous, mouthy, and insubordinate. His soldiering and leadership were products of his time at West Point; his insubordination was a product of his time under leadership that neither rose up to his vision nor equaled his tolerance.

Hooker’s goal was to confront Lee at the site of the previous defeat, but this time from two sides—the north and the west. With a sizable contingency remaining in Fredericksburg to face Lee’s troops, Hooker pushed 70,000 men across the Rappahannock well west of the town. This part of the Union army hoped to surprise Lee on his flank and crush him into submission.

However, as with any large logistical operation, the movement of troops in this war was rarely a secret. As Hooker established his position on the ground at Chancellorsville, Lee divided his troops, leaving a force to defend Fredericksburg and taking about 40,000 soldiers to meet Hooker.

On May 1, Lee and his most dependable general, Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson (above), created one of the gutsiest plans of the campaign in order to thwart Hooker’s attack.

“That night,” historian E. B. Long states, “Lee and Jackson talked. Out of that cracker-barrel conference came one of the most daring decisions of military history. Lee would split his army once more, disobeying the laws of strategy and tactics.” Lee and Jackson would further segment the Confederate forces by sending Jackson, with 30,000 troops, around the southern edge of Hooker’s line in order to outflank the would-be outflankers.

The number of men who pitched war in this moment was great; the Union army counted around 130,000 while the Confederates had less than half of that many, placing about 60,000 soldiers in the field. The numbers, however, would belie the result.

Next: Chancellorsville, Part Two: The Confederacy’s Pyrrhic Moment

—Warren Perry, Natioanl Portrait Galery, Catalog of American Portraits

Cited:
E. B. Long, The Civil War, Day by Day (New York: De Capo, 1971).